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Abstract
Housing-bubble discussions generally rely on indirect barometers such as rapidly increasing 
prices, unrealistic expectations of future price increases, and rising ratios of housing price indexes 
to household income indexes. These indirect measures cannot answer the key question of whether 
housing prices are justified by the anticipated cash flow. We show how to estimate the 
fundamental value of a house and use unique rent and price data for matched single-family homes 
in ten metropolitan areas to illustrate this approach. These data indicate that current housing 
prices are not, in fact, a bubble in most of these cities in that, under a variety of plausible 
assumptions, buying a house at current market prices still appears to be an attractive long-term 
investment. Our results also demonstrate the flaw in models that gauge bubbles by comparing 
movements in housing price indexes to movements in other indexes or to values predicted by 
regression models.Bubble, Bubble, Where’s the Housing Bubble?
U. S. housing prices have risen by about 50% in the past five years, and more than 100% in 
some hot markets. Many knowledgeable observers believe that we are in the midst of a 
speculative bubble in residential real estate prices that rivals the dot-com bubble in the 1990s and 
that will have a similarly unhappy conclusion.
In December 2004, UCLA Anderson Forecast’s Economic Outlook described the California 
housing market as a bubble, repeating their warnings made in previous years. Yale economist 
Robert Shiller has issued similar housing-bubble alarms for several years and, in June 2005, 
warned that, “The [housing] market is in the throes of a bubble of unprecedented proportions 
that probably will end ugly.” Shiller suggests that real housing prices might fall by 50% over the 
next decade. In August 2005, Princeton’s Paul Krugman argued that there was definitely a 
housing bubble on the coasts and that, indeed, the air had already begun leaking out of the bubble.
Evidence of a housing bubble has been suggestive, but indirect, in that it does not address the 
key question of whether housing prices are justified by the value of the services provided by 
houses. We show how to use rental data to estimate the fundamental value of a house and use a 
unique set of rent and price data for matched single-family homes in ten metropolitan areas to 
illustrate this approach. Our evidence indicates that, even though prices have risen rapidly and 
some buyers have unrealistic expectations of continuing price increases, the bubble is not, in fact, 
a bubble in most of these areas in that, under a variety of plausible assumptions, buying a house 
at current market prices still appears to be an attractive long-term investment.
Our results also demonstrate that models that gauge a housing bubble by comparing 
movements in housing price indexes to movements in other indexes or to the values predicted by 
regression models are flawed because they assume that market prices fluctuate randomly around 
1fundamental values. They must assume that prices were close to fundamentals in the past in 
order to conclude that the 2001-2005 runup pushed prices above fundamentals; maybe prices 
were below fundamentals in the past and the 2001-2005 runup pushed prices closer to 
fundamentals.
Defining a Bubble
Charles Kindleberger (1987) defined a bubble this way:
a sharp rise in price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, with the initial 
rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers—generally 
speculators interested in profits from trading rather than in its use or earning capacity. The 
rise is then followed by a reversal of expectations and a sharp decline in price, often 
resulting in severe financial crisis—in short, the bubble bursts. 
Researchers often focus on specific aspects of this general concept: rapidly rising prices (Baker 
2002), unrealistic expectations of future price increases (Case and Shiller 2003); the departure of 
prices from fundamental value (Garber 2000), or a large drop in prices after the bubble pops 
(Siegel 2003).
Shiller and Case (2003) wrote that “A tendency to view housing as an investment is a defining 
characteristic of a ‘housing bubble’.” To the contrary, we believe that the correct way to gauge a 
bubble is to view housing as an investment. (And that one of the main sources of mispricing in 
the housing market is that almost none of the participants estimate the fundamental value of their 
houses.)
We define a bubble as a situation in which the market prices of a certain class of assets (such 
as stocks or real estate) rise far above the present value of the anticipated cash flow from the 
asset (what Kindleberger called the asset’s use or earning capacity). This definition suggests 
many of the features noted above: prices rising rapidly, a speculative focus on future price 
2increases rather than the asset’s cash flow, and an eventual drop in market prices. However, these 
features are only suggestive. Market prices can rise rapidly, and be expected to rise rapidly in the 
future, if fundamental values are increasing rapidly or if market prices are far below fundamental 
values. Market prices can drop (for example, in a financial crisis) even when there has been no 
bubble. What truly defines a bubble is that market prices are not justified by the asset’s 
anticipated cash flow.
Is the Housing Market Efficient?
True believers in efficient markets might deny that there can ever be a bubble. The market 
price is always the correct price and is therefore justified by the expectations market participants 
hold. Even Siegel (2003), who believes there can be bubbles, writes that, “We know that the price 
of any asset is the present value of all future expected cash flows.” Contrast this with the 
opening sentence of John Burr Williams’ classic treatise, The Theory of Investment Value (1938): 
“Separate and distinct things not to be confused, as every thoughtful investor knows, are real 
worth and market price.” In the stock market, these two arguments can perhaps be reconciled by 
a consideration of whether the anticipated cash flows investors use to calculate present values are 
reasonable. The residential real estate market is fundamentally different in that homebuyers 
generally do not calculate present values.
Case and Shiller (2003) report survey evidence of homeowners’ naive beliefs about the real 
estate market. The residential real estate market is populated by amateurs making infrequent 
transactions on the basis of limited information and with little or no experience in gauging the 
fundamental value of the houses they are buying and selling. It is highly unlikely that residential 
real-estate prices are always equal to the present value of the expected cash flow if market 
participants almost never attempt to estimate the present value of the expected cash flow.
Instead, the nearly universal yardstick in residential real estate is “comps,” the recent sale 
3prices of nearby houses with similar characteristics. Comps tell us how much others have paid 
for houses recently, but not whether these prices are justified by the cash flow. Is a Britannia the 
British Bear Beanie Baby worth $500 because a Princess Beanie Baby sold for $500? Is this 
house worth $1 million because a similar house sold for $1 million? The nearly universal use of 
comps by buyers, sellers, real estate agents, and appraisers is the very mechanism by which 
market prices can wander far from fundamental values. If no one is estimating fundamental value, 
why should we assume that market prices will equal fundamental values?
In the stock market, professional investors can, in theory, arbitrage and exploit the mistakes 
made by noise traders. In the housing market, however, professionals cannot sell houses short 
and cannot obtain the tax advantages available for owner-occupied housing by physically 
occupying multiple houses. It is also expensive to manage and monitor rental houses, especially 
from afar. If a myopic focus on comps causes housing prices to depart from fundamentals, there 
is no effective self-correcting mechanism.
In an inefficient market, prices can be above or below fundamental value. Housing bubble 
enthusiasts implicitly assume that market prices were, on average, equal to fundamental values in 
the past in order to conclude that recent increases have pushed prices above fundamental values. 
Perhaps housing prices were too low in the past and recent price increases have brought market 
prices more in line with fundamentals.
Bubblemetrics
Researchers have used a variety of proxies to gauge whether there is a bubble in the real estate 
market. One pervasive problem is the reliance on aggregate measures of housing prices that are 
notoriously imperfect because: houses are so heterogeneous in their characteristics and location; it 
is difficult to measure the depreciation and remodeling of existing homes; and it is difficult to 
measure changes in the quality of home construction over time. McCarthy and Peach (2004) 
4show that, between 1977 and 2003, four popular home price indexes showed price appreciation 
ranging from 199% (constant quality new homes) to 337% (median price of sales of existing 
homes).
Even if the price indexes were perfect, their application is questionable. For example, Case and 
Shiller (2003) look at the ratio of housing prices to household income, the idea being that housing 
prices are a bubble waiting to pop if the median buyer is priced out of the market. But the 
affordability of a house has little to do with its intrinsic value. Berkshire Hathaway stock 
currently sells for nearly $100,000 a share. It is not affordable for most investors, but it may be 
worth the price!
Even on its own terms, the ratio of housing prices to income doesn’t really measure 
affordability. A better measure would be the ratio of mortgage payments to income. Mortgage 
rates have fallen dramatically and the ratio of mortgage payments on a constant-quality new 
home to median family income has fallen steadily, from 0.35 in 1981 to 0.13 in 2003 (McCarthy 
and Peach 2004 ).
The Local Market Monitor, which is widely cited in the popular press, uses a variation on the 
Case-Shiller approach to compare cities. It calculates the ratio of a metropolitan area’s relative 
home prices (the ratio of a local home price index to a national home price index) to the area’s 
relative income (the ratio of average local income to average national income). The extent to which 
the current value of this ratio deviates from the historical average value of the ratio for this 
metropolitan area is used to measure whether homes are overpriced or underpriced.
National City Corporation uses a multiple regression model relating the ratio of housing prices 
to household income in a metropolitan area to its historical prices, population density, mortgage 
rate, and the ratio of household income in this area to the national average. The amount by which 
actual market prices deviate from the prices predicted by the multiple regression model is 
5interpreted as the extent to which homes are overpriced or underpriced.
One problem with regression models is that the equations are likely to be misspecified in that 
fundamental values are a highly nonlinear function of many variables. For example, Case and 
Shiller (2003) estimate the relationship between housing prices and per capita personal income 
between 1985 and 2002, but omit interest rates from their model. If interest rates are included in 
models, we need both the mortgage rate (which affects the cash flow) and the homebuyers’ 
required return (which is used to discount the cash flow), and the relationship is very nonlinear.
Even more fundamentally, these models assume that past home prices were determined by 
fundamental factors (with a random error term), so that any systematic deviations of current 
prices from the values predicted by the model must be because current prices have wandered 
away from fundamental values. However, if current market prices are higher than the values 
predicted by multiple regression models using historical prices, it may be because past prices 
were consistently below fundamental values.
Indianapolis is an interesting example in that it has had relatively stable housing prices that are 
easy to “explain” with multiple regression models using historical prices and household income as 
explanatory variables. In the National City Corporation model, Indianapolis home prices have 
varied between 11% underpriced and 17% overpriced for the period studied, 1985-2005. Because 
they “recommend treating valuation metrics between +/- 15 percent as ‘fair value,’” they 
conclude that Indianapolis houses have almost always been fairly valued. In reality, the 
regression model doesn’t address the question of whether Indianapolis home prices are close to 
fundamental values. We will see later in this paper that Indianapolis housing prices are almost 
certainly far below fundamental values.
Some economists (e.g., Leamer 2002) cite the fact that home prices have risen faster than rents 
as evidence of a bubble. Krainer and Wei (2004) report that there has been a 30% real increase in 
6home prices over the past decade and only a 10% real increase in rents over this same period, 
suggesting that prices are departing from fundamentals.
The fundamental value of a house depends on the anticipated rents, in the same way that the 
fundamental value of bonds and stocks depends on the present value of the cash flow from these 
assets. However, just as bond and stock prices are not a constant multiple of coupons and 
dividends, we should not expect the fundamental value of a house to be a constant multiple of 
rents. Among the many factors that affect the price-rent ratio are interest rates, risk premiums, 
growth rates, and tax laws (including property, income, and capital gains taxes). Thus, just as 
with price-earnings ratios in the stock market, price-rent ratios in the housing market can rise 
without signaling a bubble if, for example, interest rates fall or there is an increase in the 
anticipated rate of growth of rents.
In addition, the dwellings included in price indexes do not match the dwellings in rent indexes, 
giving us a comparison of apples to oranges (McCarthy and Peach 2004). The ratio of a house 
price index to a rent index can rise because the prices of houses in desirable neighborhoods 
increased more than did the rents of apartment buildings in less desirable neighborhoods. Or 
perhaps the quality of the average house in the price index has increased relative to the quality of 
the average property in the rent index. In any case, to gauge fundamental value, we need actual 
rent and price data, not indexes with arbitrary scales.
Similarly, Leamer (2002) compares median home prices to the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) owner’s equivalent rent index, and Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) compare rents for 
representative 2-bedroom apartments to the repeat-sales index compiled by Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). Even if the properties are comparable, they cannot 
gauge whether prices are high or low relative to rents because each study compares dollars to 
indexes.
7Buying Versus Renting
Thus we are inevitably drawn back to the need to use actual rent data to estimate a house’s 
fundamental value, which can then be compared with actual market prices. Because shelter can be 
obtained either by renting or buying, the implicit cash flow from an owner-occupied house is the 
rent that would otherwise be paid to live in the house.
Buying and renting have sometimes been analyzed as demands for different commodities. 
Rosen (1979) wrote that, “In many cases it is difficult (say) to rent a single unit with a large 
backyard. Similarly, it may be impractical for a homeowner to contract for the kind of 
maintenance services available to a renter.” A decade later, Goodman (1988) observed that, “Until 
recently, it was easier to purchase small (large) amounts of housing by renting (owning). As a 
result, households with tastes for small (large) units would rent (buy).”
Today, it is still true that rental and sale properties differ, on average, in location and 
attributes. But, on the margin, close substitutes are generally available. It is possible to buy small 
condominiums and to rent houses with large yards. It is possible to buy or rent small or large 
houses. Many households have the option of buying houses in communities that provide services 
very similar to those received by most renters.
We consequently view buying and renting as often being viable alternatives. If a household has 
the opportunity to buy or rent very similar properties (perhaps even the same property), then 
the relevant question is whether to pay for these housing services by buying the house or renting 
it. Admittedly, there are other considerations that make renting and owning a different experience. 
Renters may have different preferences (in paint colors and furnishings, for example) than do 
their landlords; renters cannot reap the full benefits of improvements they make to the property 
inside and out; and renters may have less privacy than do owners. These are all arguments for 
why owning is better than renting and, to the extent they matter, our calculations underestimate 
8the value of homeownership. Both renters and owners also confront uncertainty—renters about 
future rents and housing prices, too, if they might to buy a house in the future; owners about 
future homeownership expenses and future housing prices if they might someday sell their house 
and move to a location with different rents and prices.
Fundamental Value
Rental savings are the central, but not the only, factor in determining the fundamental value of 
an owner-occupied house. We have to look at everything that affects the cash flow, including 
transaction costs, the down payment, insurance, maintenance, property taxes, mortgage 
payments, tax savings, and the proceeds if the house is sold at some point.
Once we have the projected cash flow, we can value houses the same way we value bonds, 
stocks, and other assets—by discounting the cash flow by the household’s required rate of 
return. Specifically, we can calculate the net present value (NPV) of the entire cash flow, 
including the initial outlay:
     
† 
NPV= X0 +
X1
1+ R ( )
1 +
X2
1+ R ( )
2 +
X3
1+ R ( )
3 +K+
Xn
1+ R ( )
n (1)
X0 is a negative number equal to the downpayment and out-of-pocket closing costs; Xn is the net 
amount received when the house is sold and the mortgage balance (if any) is paid off. The 
intervening cash flows are the rent you would otherwise have to pay to live in this house minus 
the expenses associated with home ownership, plus the value of nonfinancial factors (such as a 
desire for privacy). The rent and other expenses can be estimated from observed data. The 
intangibles must be assigned values by the household.
The required return R depends on the rates of return available on other investments. The initial 
downpayment ties up funds that could otherwise be invested in bonds, stocks, and other assets; 
9as the years pass, the net rental savings free up funds that can be invested elsewhere. The 
required return depends on current interest rates, the degree of leverage, and uncertainty about the 
prospective cash flow. Our view is that the cash flow is less certain than that from highly rated 
bonds but more certain than that from a diversified stock portfolio, and that uncertainties about 
the cash flow are not strongly correlated with uncertainties about bond and stock returns.
A homebuyer can use the projected cash flow and a required rate of return to determine if a 
house’s net present value (NPV) is positive or negative. If the NPV is positive, the house is 
indeed worth what it costs; if the NPV is negative, renting is more financially attractive. Equation 
1 can also be used to determine a prospective buyer’s reservation price that would make the NPV 
equal to zero. (Because mortgage payments and other components of the cash flow depend on 
the price of the house, the reservation price is not simply equal to the market price plus the 
NPV.) The reservation price can be interpreted as the fundamental value of the house, and the 
difference between the market price P and the reservation price P* measures whether the house is 
overpriced or underpriced, what we will call the premium:
  
† 
premium=100
P-P*
P*
We can also calculate the internal rate of return (IRR), which is the value of the required return 
for which the NPV equals zero. The cash flow from residential real estate is generally negative 
initially and positive in later years, with just one sign change, so that the NPV is a monotonically 
decreasing function of the required return. If so, the IRR identifies the breakeven required return 
for which the investor is indifferent about the investment, and the NPV is positive for any 
required return less than the IRR.
Some Simple Intuition
Consider a house that is purchased for cash and never sold. The present value of the future net 
10cash flow Xt is
  
† 
V=
Xt
1+ R ( )
t
t=1
•
Â (2)
Now suppose that the house is sold at a future date for a price equal to the present value of the 
cash flow beyond that date
  
† 
V=
Xt
1+ R ( )
t
t=1
n
Â +
Pn
1+ R ( )
n (3)
where
  
† 
Pn =
Xn+t
1+ R ( )
t
t=1
•
Â (4)
The substitution of Equation (4) into (3) gives Equation (2), so that this present value equation 
holds if the house is held forever or is sold at some future date for a price equal to the present 
value of the cash flow.
If the net cash flow is growing at a constant rate g, then Equation (2) simplifies to the standard 
dividend-discount model for stocks with constantly growing dividends:
  
† 
V=
X1(1+ g)t-1
1+ R ( )
t
t=1
•
Â
=
X1
R- g
(5)
It is worth noting that seemingly small changes in R or g can have a substantial effect on the 
value of a house. Suppose that the net monthly cash flow is $1,000 ($12,000 annually), the 
required annual after-tax rate of return is 9%, and the annual growth rate of the cash flow is 3%. 
Working with annual cash flows, the house’s value is
11  
† 
V=
X1
R- g
=
$12,000
0.09-0.03
= $200,000
If the required return falls to 6% the value of the house doubles:
  
† 
V=
X1
R- g
=
$12,000
0.06-0.03
= $400,000
Richard Peach (2005) has argued that the recent run-up in home prices is, in fact, a one-time 
adjustment of prices to lower interest rates.
If the homebuyer is able to buy the home for a price P0 that is equal to the present value of the 
cash flow, then the first-year return is equal to the current cash flow yield plus the cash flow’s 
growth rate:
  
† 
R =
X1
P0
+
P1 -P0
P0
= X1
P0
+ g
(6)
Equation 6 has a very natural interpretation. The lefthand side is the homebuyer’s required 
rate of return. The righthand side is the anticipated actual return—the current yield X1/P0 plus 
the anticipated rate of increase in the value of the house. If the buyer’s expectations are realized, 
then the buyer will earn the required rate of return. In this simple case, we could use data on the 
current yield plus the projected rate of growth of the cash flow to estimate the buyer’s 
anticipated rate of return.
In practice, matters are complicated by the fact that most buyers have mortgages that create 
12leverage. Using an interest-only mortgage for simplicity, with a downpayment lP0 and after-tax 
mortgage rate Rm, the amount invested is lP0 and the current cash flow is   
† 
X1- Rm(1- l)P0. 
Thus, the leveraged first-year return is
  
† 
RL =
X1 -Rm(1- l)P0
lP0
+
P1- P0
lP0
= Rm+ 1
l
X1
P0
+ P1- P0
P0
- Rm
Ê 
Ë 
Á 
ˆ 
¯ 
˜ 
(7)
The leveraged return is equal to the mortgage rate plus the leverage factor 1/l times the difference 
between the unlevered return and the mortgage rate.
These simple models illustrate the general principles that the anticipated unlevered after-tax 
return is the cash flow yield plus the cash flow’s anticipated growth rate; and that the anticipated 
levered after-tax return is higher or lower than the mortgage rate depending on whether the 
unlevered return is higher or lower than the after-tax mortgage rate. In practice, the calculations 
are more complicated because: (a) there are substantial transaction costs; (b) the various elements 
of the cash flow do not necessarily grow at the same rate; and (c) the amount of leverage changes 
over time as the value of the house grows and, with conventional amortized loans, the loan 
balance declines. We consequently need detailed cash flow projections in order to determine the 
NPV, IRR, and premium.
Data
To illustrate this approach, we gathered data for matched pairs of single-family homes that 
were purchased or rented in the summer of 2005 in the ten metropolitan areas shown in Table 1. 
These cities were chosen to include a variety of geographic areas in the United States and also to 
include various degrees of alleged housing market frothiness.
Los Angeles County has more than 10 million residents living in more than 200 cities and 
unincorporated areas. San Bernardino County has nearly 2 million residents living in an expanse 
13of deserts and mountains stretching from the eastern edge of Los Angeles County to the Nevada 
border. Orange County is south of Los Angeles County and although it is geographically small by 
southern California standards, it is the fifth most populous county in the United States, Because 
these three counties are each so geographically varied and heavily populated, we limited our 
study to several cities within each county that contain packets of relatively homogeneous homes: 
Los Angeles (Azusa, Bellflower, Claremont, Diamond Bar, Glendora, Hacienda Heights, La 
Puente, La Verne, Pacoima, Phillips Ranch, Pomona, Rosemead, San Dimas, Walnut, and West 
Covina); San Bernardino (Alta Loma, Chino Hills, Fontana, Montclair, Ontario, Rancho 
Cucamonga, Redlands, Rialto, San Bernardino, and Upland); and Orange County (Buena Park, 
Fullerton, Huntington Beach, Irvine, La Habra, Laguna Beach, Laguna Hills, Lake Forest, Mission 
Viejo, Newport Beach, Orange, Rancho San Margarita, Santa Ana, Tustin, and Yorba Linda).
We looked at every city in San Mateo County, which is located just south of San Francisco; in 
the Dallas area, we only looked at the city of Dallas. For the other five metropolitan areas, we 
looked at the major cities plus surrounding suburbs.
The areas included in our study, in other studies, and in various government indexes do not 
match perfectly. For example, the BLS owner’s equivalent rent indexes lump together Los 
Angeles, Riverside, and Orange County while the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO) housing price indexes put Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ontario together, even 
though Riverside is in Riverside County and San Bernardino and Ontario are in San Bernardino 
County. Similarly, the National City Corporation gives separate valuation numbers for Los 
Angeles, Riverside, and Santa Ana (a large city in Orange County), while the Local Market 
Monitor gives a valuation for Los Angeles-Anaheim (Anaheim being another large city in Orange 
County) and for Riverside-San Bernardino.
Table 2 shows the annual percentage increases in population, median household income, 
14OFHEO housing prices, and BLS owner-equivalent rents during the twenty years 1985-2005, 
and the price and rent indexes for the more recent ten years 1995-2005. For comparison, the 
annual percentage increase in the CPI was 3.02% for 1985-2005 and 2.49% for 1995-2005. 
Housing prices in the four California areas and Boston increased much faster than rents or the 
CPI, particularly during the period 1995-2005. Figure 1 shows time series data for housing prices 
back to 1976 for Los Angeles, Chicago, and Dallas.
In compiling our data in each of the 10 metropolitan areas, the matched rental and sale 
properties could differ by no more than 100 square feet in size, no more than 1 bedroom, and no 
more than half a bath. When the information was available, we also compared the houses’ ages, 
style (for example, ranch), and identified amenities (such as a pool and the size of the garage). 
Because the three most important factors in real estate are location, location, location, Yahoo 
maps was used to estimate the driving distance between properties (no more than 1 mile) and to 
identify golf courses, parks, lakes, major highways, and other physical objects that might add to 
or detract from a house’s value. It was evident from these maps that driving distance often 
exaggerates the physical distance between houses; for example, two houses might have adjoining 
back yards but have a driving distance of 0.1 or even 0.2 miles. One problem we encountered is 
that square footage is traditionally not reported in the Atlanta area; so we restricted our Atlanta 
matches to houses that have exactly the same number of bedrooms and bathrooms and that are no 
more than 0.2 miles driving distance from each other.
When there were multiple matches (for example, two sales to one similar rental), and we used 
the best overall match in terms of square footage, distance, and so on. Occasionally, there was a 
perfect match in that a house that had been rented was sold, or a house was sold and then rented. 
Sometimes, we found essentially adjacent tract houses that had been built within a year of each 
other and had exactly the same number of bedrooms and bathrooms and square feet. Unless there 
15was a perfect match, the sale and rental properties surely differ in unknown ways (carpet versus 
wood floors, fireplace or no fireplace, paint colors), but we can hope that these differences 
average out over our sample so that single-family homes that were rented in the summer of 2005 
were not systematically better or worse than the matched single-family homes that were sold 
during the same time period. If the rental properties are, on average, inferior to the sale 
properties, then our calculations underestimate the returns to purchasing a house. Table 3 shows 
the mean physical characteristics of the data in our sample; Table 4 shows the average distance 
between our matched pairs, and the means of the absolute value of the differences between the 
matched pairs in the number of bedrooms and the number of bathrooms.
Our data were gathered in the fall of 2005 with the objective of gauging the housing market as 
of July 15, 2005. We consequently tried to find sale and rental transactions that occurred near 
July 15, extending our search as far as May or September in order to obtain roughly 100 matches 
for each metropolitan area. The increases in each area’s BLS rents and OFHEO housing prices 
during 2005 were used to adjust all rents and sale prices to July 15 values. All of the data 
reported here refer to these adjusted prices. Table 5 shows the average of the sale prices, monthly 
rents, and the ratio of the annual rent to the sale price for the matched properties. Also shown is 
the first-year cash flow (rent net of all estimated expenses), which will be explained shortly.
Analysis
In principle, we should use the appropriate parameter values for the marginal homebuyer in 
each area in July 2005. In practice, we don’t know all of the details—such as AMT status—and 
must consequently use seemingly reasonable values. Specific households should use parameter 
values that reflect their own particular situation.
The following national assumptions were used in estimating the cash flow: 20% 
downpayment, 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, 5.7% mortgage rate (the average 30-year mortgage 
16rate in mid-July 2005), buyer’s closing costs equal to 0.5% of the sale price, maintenance equal to 
1% of the price, 28% federal income tax rate, 15% federal capital gains tax (on capital gains in 
excess of $500,000), 6% seller’s transaction cost if the house is sold. State and metropolitan-area 
data were used for property taxes, state income taxes, and home insurance.
Most states have a fixed property tax rate that is applied to the amount by which the assessed 
value exceeds a homeowner’s exemption. Massachusetts communities set property tax rates 
annually so that total tax revenue does not exceed the amount allowed by Proposition 2 1/2. We 
consequently used actual 2004 property taxes for the Massachusetts houses in our data base that 
have these tax data to estimate the property taxes for those houses with missing data; we then 
assumed that property taxes will increase by 2.5% annually. Analogous methods were used for 
Indiana and Illinois properties. California assessed values are initially based on the sale price and 
then assumed to increase by 2% annually, in accord with Proposition 13. For the other 
metropolitan areas, we assume that assessed values increase by 3% a year.
The baseline model assumes a 3% annual increase in housing rents and expenses (roughly the 
recent historical and predicted rate of CPI inflation) and a 6% required after-tax return. One of the 
authors presented some preliminary calculations at a meeting of 27 Certified Financial Planners 
(CFPs) and asked them what required after-tax return they would use if they adopted our house-
valuation methodology; all answered either 5% or 6%. A New York Times (Leonhardt 2005) 
comparison of buying and renting assumed a 4% after-tax return. If we use 4% or 5% in place of 
our 6% assumption, this would increase the estimated fundamental values. 
Long Horizons
One way to gauge whether market prices can be justified without unrealistic expectations 
about future prices is, as with dividend-discount models of stock prices, assume that the 
investment is for keeps—that the buyer never sells and is therefore unconcerned about future 
17prices. Few people literally plan to hold stocks or houses forever, but this assumption allows us 
to determine whether the cash flow alone is sufficient to justify the current market price. We will 
use this approach and we will also look at some finite horizons with modest assumptions about 
future prices.
Some of our reported results are for annual horizons of one to 30 years. When we need to save 
space by focusing on a single finite horizon, we show a 10-year horizon—a round number that is 
somewhat longer than U. S. Census survey data showing that the median homeowner has been 
living in their current residence for 8 years (Hansen 1998) and somewhat shorter than the 13-year 
expected total residence time for homeowners estimated by Anily, Hornik, and Israeli (1999). 
The 8-year number is flawed because we don’t know how much longer people will stay in their 
current residence. The 13-year number is based on a convenient model with simplifying 
assumptions. Any specific homeowner using our model should look at horizons that are 
consistent with their own particular circumstances.
Households that move within a specified price area can effectively have very long horizons. 
For example, if someone lives in a given housing market for 60 years and changes houses every 10 
or 15 years, movements in housing prices aren’t that important since if they sell high/low, they 
buy high/low too. Over very long horizons, if annual capital gains are substantially less than the 
required return, the rent savings from ownership will dominate the capital gains and homebuyers 
should consequently focus on whether the rent savings justify the current market price. If the 
capital gains turn out to be large enough to matter, then that is an added bonus from home 
ownership. Thus, unless households anticipate moving from a high-price area to a low-price area 
(or vice versa) or substantially changing the size of their house, they should use a very long 
horizon in their analysis and focus on rental savings rather than price appreciation.
Once one focuses on the rental savings over a long horizon, a leveraged house is not as risky an 
18investment as one might think. There are a variety of ways to think about this including the low 
correlation of rents with wages, stocks returns, bond returns, and other parts of your portfolio. 
While buying a house may seem risky, not buying is risky too since a household that chooses to 
rent may find that it gets priced out of the housing market and has to pay variable rents for a 
very long time. Or think of it this way, unlike stocks, bonds, and conventional assets, we all need 
a place to live—which we can pay for with rent or with mortgage payments. Which is riskier: 
fixed mortgage payments or rent payments that change annually? Even with 0% down and 
infinite leverage, it could reasonably be argued that a fixed-rate mortgage is less risky than 
uncertain rent payments—in the same way that one might argue that a fixed-rate mortgage is less 
risky than a variable-rate mortgage.
Where’s the Bubble?
Table 6 shows the median values of the NPVs, IRRs, and premiums (the percentage by which 
the market price exceeded the reservation price) for each of the ten metropolitan areas. The 
infinite horizon makes no assumptions about future prices, the 10-year horizon assumes that 
housing prices rise by 3% a year. Figure 2 shows box plots for each of the 10 metropolitan areas 
of each matched pair’s premium with an infinite horizon.
For our baseline assumptions, only San Mateo seems bubbly, with a median IRR of 4.61% for 
an infinite horizon and 3.51% for a 10-year horizon. For a homebuyer with a 6% required return, 
the median San Mateo property is 54% overpriced with an infinite horizon and 42% overpriced 
with a 10-year horizon. Orange County seems to be fairly valued, while Los Angeles, San 
Bernardino, Boston, and Chicago are all somewhat underpriced. Home prices in Dallas, New 
Orleans, Atlanta, and Indianapolis appear to be substantially below fundamental values.
Table 5 shows that in Indianapolis, the average monthly rent is about half what it is in Boston, 
but market prices are one-fourth Boston levels, and the average initial monthly cash flow is 
19positive in Indianapolis but negative in Boston. The average value of the ratio of the initial annual 
cash flow to the house’s price is 3.32% in Indianapolis and, with a 20% downpayment, the ratio 
of the cash flow to the downpayment is 5 times the numbers shown in the last column of Table 
5. With these favorable fundamentals, Table 6 shows that Indianapolis housing prices are only 
about a third of fundamental values.
New Orleans is a particularly interesting case, in that it vividly illustrates that we are not 
attempting to time the market or predict housing prices. When one estimates the fundamental 
value of a stock, the proper question is not whether the price will be higher tomorrow than it is 
today, but whether, given currently available information, the projected cash flow is sufficient to 
justify the market price in the sense that an investor would be happy to pay today’s price in 
order to receive the anticipated cash flow. The same is true here. Our objective is to estimate, 
based on information available in the summer of 2005, whether the projected cash flow from the 
houses we looked at is sufficient to justify market prices. Accounting fraud, oil discoveries, 
hurricanes, and other unexpected events may well lead to substantial revisions in the fundamental 
values of stocks and houses.
Orange County is also interesting in that Figure 2 shows that there appear to be almost as 
many houses that sold at a discount from fundamental value as sold at a premium. While it may 
be hard to find a bargain in San Mateo and easy to find one in Indianapolis, homebuyers in 
Orange County can find plenty of houses that are priced above and below fundamental values. Of 
course, in every city, there are different degrees of underpricing and overpricing, and prospective 
home buyers should make their own estimates of the rental savings and other components of the 
cash flow and apply their own personal required return in order to estimate the fundamental 
value of the houses they are considering purchasing.
Table 7 compares our assessment of housing prices in these 10 metropolitan areas with those 
20of National City Corporation and Local Market Monitor. By our reckoning, San Mateo’s bubble 
ranking should be higher and San Bernardino’s much lower. Among the bottom four cities, it is 
Indianapolis, not Dallas, that is the biggest bargain. More generally, while National City 
Corporation and Local Market Monitor consider most of these 10 metropolitan areas to be 
overpriced, based largely on the recent increases in home prices, our comparison of 2005 prices 
with fundamental values indicates that most are fairly priced or underpriced.
Predicting Future Prices
Our objective here is not to predict future movements in housing prices, but rather to gauge 
whether plausible projections of the cash flow are sufficient to justify current prices. This is 
most obvious in the forever calculations, which assume that the homeowner buys for keeps. For 
the finite-horizon calculations, we assume modest rates of price appreciation that are consistent 
with predicted rates of inflation and historical increases in house prices.
We might temper these price projections by a comparison of fundamental values with current 
market prices. If we believe that market prices will equal fundamental values at some point in the 
future, then we might be more optimistic about the future rate of increase of housing prices in 
Indianapolis than in San Mateo. Similarly, if one is willing to assume that market prices will 
converge to fundamental values by the time the homeowner is ready to sell, then one could 
project fundamental values at that future date. For instance we could predict rents, mortgage 
rates, and the model’s other parameters 10 years from now; use these parameter values to predict 
fundamental values 10 years from now; and then predict market prices 10 years from now by 
assuming that they will equal fundamental values at that time.
We have not done this because of our deep skepticism about whether the residential real estate 
market has any effective mechanisms for anchoring market prices to fundamental values. We will 
see evidence later that residential real estate prices can remain far from fundamental values for a 
21substantial period of time.
Stricter Matching Criteria
Table 8 shows the median values of the premium in each metropolitan area for more stringent 
matching criteria. The same-house data are the smallest samples, but the purest matches in that 
these houses could literally have been purchased or rented in the summer of 2005. The only 
weakness in these data is if there were any special circumstances, such as a below-market rent for 
someone who agreed to repaint the house or perhaps the house was purchased and major 
renovations made before it was rented. The perfect-match data include the same-house data and 
also houses that are quantitatively identical (same number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and square 
footage) and virtually adjacent. The close-match data expand the sample to include houses with 
up to 50-foot difference in square footage that are less than 0.50 miles from each other.
The results are generally consistent across matching criteria, with a tendency (except for the 
very small Boston and New Orleans samples) for the stricter criteria to reduce the premium. In 
Indianapolis, for example, with an infinite horizon, the median house in the full sample of 103 
matched pairs sold for 65% below its reservation price, while the median house among the 23 
houses that were both sold and rented had a market price 75% below its reservation price.
Risks
We can gauge the robustness of our results by varying our key assumptions. For example, 
Table 9 shows the median values of the premium for different growth rates of rents and prices. 
Annual rent growth rates of 2%, 3%, and 4% are roughly the historical range shown in Table 2 
across these 10 metropolitan areas. For each of these rent growth rates, we report results for an 
infinite horizon with no assumptions about future housing prices and for 10-year horizons with 
annual price increases of 0%, 3%, and 6%. 
As expected, the faster the growth of rent, the more financially attractive are houses in all of 
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approximately 4% over the 20-year period 1985-2005. The last column shows that if this were 
to continue indefinitely, house prices in the summer of 2005 would be fully justified in all of 
these areas, even San Mateo. For 10-year horizons with 4% annual rent growth, housing prices 
would have to increase by more than 3% a year to justify San Mateo prices. At the other end of 
the spectrum, housing prices in Dallas, Indianapolis, Atlanta, and New Orleans were financially 
justified even with 2% rent growth and 0% price growth. Even if Indianapolis rents and prices 
were not to grow at all, the IRR would be 15.58% with a 10-year horizon and 13.17% with an 
infinite horizon.
Capital Gains Matter in the Short Run, Rent Savings in the Long Run
National City Corporation and the Local Market Monitor identify San Bernardino County as 
being 65% and 56% overpriced, respectively. Figure 3 shows the median IRRs for with long-run 
price growth rates ranging from 0% to 3%. (In order to show more details, the IRRs with a 1-year 
horizon are omitted; they range from -18.3% with 3% price growth to -35.6% with 0% price 
growth.) As shown, over long horizons, the IRRs are not very sensitive to price growth rates in 
this range. Figure 4, in contrast, shows that the long-run IRRs are sensitive to the assumed long-
run rate of growth of rents. Thus, shortfalls in price appreciation are more important in the short 
run, while shortfalls in rent growth are more important in the long run.
Another way to make is this point is to observe that with a 6% required return and 3% price 
appreciation, the present value of the price declines by about 3% a year and the present value of 
the price 60 years from now is only 18% of what the current price. With 2% annual price 
appreciation, this present value is 10%; with 1% price appreciation, it is 6%.
We have not attempted to use a structural model to forecast rents. Such a model would no 
doubt reflect demand factors (such as population and income growth) and supply factors (such 
23as population density and zoning laws). In areas where market values exceed construction costs 
(Tobin’s q greater than 1), one could reasonably anticipate more construction. Indeed a 
comparison of housing prices with construction costs might be used to predict the amount of 
home building. However, in highly desirable areas with limited land and restrictive zoning laws, 
the site value may be a large part of a house’s market value and a comparison of changes in 
market prices and construction cost indexes might be an unreliable measure of the profitability of 
building new homes.
The calculations depicted in Figures 3 and 4 assume that the household stays in a given house 
for horizons up to 60 years. If the household changes houses within a given housing market, 
returns will be dragged down by the transaction costs incurred with every move. Table 10 shows 
the IRRs for all 10 metropolitan areas if the household moves every 10 or 15 years during a 60-
year period (a long horizon evenly divisible by 10 and 15) and incurs a 6% transaction cost each 
time it moves—though it seems unlikely that the industry will be able to maintain such high 
transaction costs for another 60 years!
A comparison of the IRRs in Table 10 for 3% rent growth with the IRRs in Table 6 for an 
infinite horizon indicates that periodic 6% transaction costs reduce the IRRs somewhat, but do 
not change the general conclusion: San Mateo seems bubbly; Dallas, New Orleans, Atlanta, and 
Indianapolis are attractively priced; and the other five areas are reasonably priced
For yet another way of looking at the data, Figure 5 shows the median breakeven required 
returns—the internal rates of return—in six metropolitan areas for a homebuyer with an infinite 
horizon and different annual growth rates of rent. To unclutter the graph, we’ve omitted New 
Orleans, which is very similar to Dallas, and Boston, Chicago, and Orange County, which all lie 
between San Bernardino and San Mateo. The vertical line drawn in the figure shows the IRRs for 
the 3% annual rent growth assumed in the baseline case. For each rent growth rate, the 
24fundamental value is less than the market price if the homebuyer’s required rate of return is 
below the line drawn for that metropolitan area. In Indianapolis and Atlanta, market prices are 
below fundamental values even with 1% long-run rent growth and double-digit after-tax required 
returns. In San Mateo, homebuyers need to assume long-run 3.8% rent growth or have a required 
return below 6% in order for market prices to be below fundamental values.
Interest Rates Matter
Although our objective is not to forecast housing prices, we can assess the extent to which 
changes in mortgage rates and required returns would affect reservation prices. Table 11 compares 
the hypothetical premiums for mortgage rates of 4.7%, 5.7% (the actual value), and 6.7%. Since 
required returns are on an after-tax basis, as the before-tax mortgage rate goes up or down by one 
percentage point, we change the after-tax required return by 0.7 percentage points (based on our 
28% marginal federal income tax rate). San Mateo looks pricey even with 4.7% mortgage rate and 
5.3% after-tax required return. Dallas, Indianapolis, Atlanta, and New Orleans look cheap even 
with 6.7% mortgage rate and 6.7% after-tax required return.
Monte Carlo Simulations
For another kind of sensitivity analysis, we can incorporate stochastic changes in rent and 
prices into the model and use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate probability distributions for 
the NPVs. We will illustrate this approach here with a matched-pair of southern California 
houses that are directly across the street from each other. Both are 2,200 square-foot, 4-bedroom, 
3-bath 2-story houses built in 1981 on 5,600 square-foot lots. From the outside, the main 
difference appears to be that one is painted a lighter color than the other. One was leased for 
$2,116 a month; the other sold for $571,098. The NPVs using a 6% required return are $25,539 
with a 10-year horizon and $57,989 with an infinite horizon.
Because our matched rent/price data are unique, there are no directly comparable historical data 
25that can be used to estimate the means, variances, and covariances of rent and prices that we need 
for our simulations. Instead, we use Los Angeles-area BLS and OFHEO indexes to give ballpark 
estimates. Over the years 1983-2004, the annual growth rates of the Los Angeles-area rent and 
price indexes were 3.9% and 6.3% respectively. We will work with monthly cash flows, but 
assume that rent increases occur every 12-months. We simplify our Monte Carlo simulations by 
assuming that price increases also occur at 12-month intervals.
We use the following simple mean-reversion model to allow random variation in the growth of 
rent and prices around a long-run annual growth rate
  
† 
y- y-1 = a ln 1+ g [ ]- y-1 ( )+ e
where y is the natural log of the ratio of the current price (or rent) to the value a year earlier, g is 
the long-run growth rate, a is the pull-back coefficient, and e is a normally distributed error term. 
This model can also be written as
  
† 
y = aln 1+ g [ ]+ (1-a)y-1 + e
Least squares regressions using annual data for the years 1983 – 2005 yielded these estimates:
Rent: y = 0.003 + 0.823y(-1),   t = 6.66, SEE = 0.005, R2 = 0.70
Price: y = 0.007 + 0.866y(-1),   t = 6.19, SEE = 0.023, R2 = 0.67
The implied pull-back factors are 0.177 for rents and 0.134 for prices; the implied long run annual 
growth rates are 1.59% for rents and 5.59% for prices. A least squares regression of the price 
residuals on the rent residuals gave a t-value of 1.21 and an R2 = 0.07, indicating that they are 
essentially uncorrelated.
We should not assume that the future will replicate the past and, indeed, it is unlikely that 
housing prices will continue to increase by four percentage points a year faster than rents. Our 
objective here is to see if the purchase of a house can be justified financially with plausible 
assumptions about future increases in rents and prices. Our illustrative calculations assume 3% 
26annual long-run growth rates and 0.2 pull-back factors for both rents and prices, an 0.005 
standard deviation of the rent error term, an 0.020 standard deviation of the price error term, and 
zero correlation between the two error terms.
For n independent simulations, each with a probability p of the NPV falling within a 
prespecified interval, the simulation standard error for the Monte Carlo estimate of p is 
approximately
  
† 
p(1- p)
n
One million simulations were used with a maximum standard error equal to 0.0005.
The fixed-rate columns in Table 12 shows the median NPVs (using a 6% after-tax required rate 
of return), and the probability that the NPV will be less than -$50,000 and less than -$100,000. 
(An NPV of -$50,000 reflects an after-tax IRR of approximately 1.8% over a 10-year horizon 
and 5.5% over an infinite horizon; an NPV of -$100,000 reflects an after-tax IRR of 
approximately -5.2% over a 10-year horizon and 5.0% over an infinite horizon.) Figure 6 shows 
the complete estimated probability distribution (labeled fixed-rate mortgage) for the NPV with a 
10-year horizon and an infinite horizon. With a 10-year horizon, there is an estimated 37.8% 
chance that the NPV will be negative (an IRR below 6%) and a 11.1% chance that the IRR will be 
negative. With an infinite horizon, there is an estimated 16.7% chance that the NPV will be 
negative and a 0.0% chance that the IRR will be negative.
Variable-Rate Mortgages
These calculations assume that the homebuyer chooses a 30-year mortgage with a fixed 
mortgage rate. Many homebuyers instead choose variable-rate mortgages, perhaps because the 
initial interest rate is less than that on a longer-term fixed rate mortgage. There are, of course, a 
plethora of fixed-rate and variable-rate options. For example, interest-only mortgages maintain 
27more leverage than do amortized mortgages—which is good if the unlevered return exceeds the 
after-tax mortgage rate but bad otherwise. We will focus on the cash-flow risk inherent in a 
variable-rate mortgage by assuming that the initial mortgage rate is 5.7%, the same as with our 30-
year fixed-rate mortgage, and that the mortgage rate is adjusted every 12 months based on the 
average interest rate on 1-year Treasury securities during the most recent month, with a 2 
percentage-point cap on the annual change in interest rates and a 10% maximum for the interest 
rate. Every time the mortgage rate is changed, the loan is amortized over the remaining years—30 
years minus the years already elapsed.
For modeling monthly changes in the Treasury rate we use the discrete version of the well-
known Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR) mean-reverting model: (1985):
  
† 
Rt - Rt-1 = a(b- Rt-1)+ Rt-1se
where the long run equilibrium interest rate is b = 0.057, the pull-back factor is a = 0.20, the 
instantaneous standard deviation is s = 0.02, and the stochastic term e is normally distributed 
with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
The Federal Reserve has monthly interest data on 1-year constant maturity Treasury 
securities back to April 1954. Since we assume that the adjustments in the mortgage rate are 
based on the monthly average interest rate at 12-month intervals, we use the changes in monthly 
average Treasury rates at 12-month intervals for guidance. During the years 1983-2004, the 
correlation between the annual percentage-point changes in the 1-year Treasury rate and Los 
Angeles-area housing prices was 0.11 (p = .61) and the correlation between annual percentage-
point changes in the 1-year Treasury rate and Los Angeles-area rents was -0.16 (p = 0.47). We 
can also look at the historical correlations for more frequent data—quarterly for the price index 
and monthly for the rent index. The correlation between quarterly percentage-point changes in 
the 1-year Treasury rate and Los Angeles-area prices was 0.12 (p = 0.20) and the correlation 
28between monthly percentage-point changes in the 1-year Treasury rate and Los Angeles-area 
rents was -0.01 (p = 0.89). Our Monte Carlo simulations consequently assume that percentage 
changes in 1-year Treasury rates are uncorrelated with rents and prices.
The variable-rate column in Table 12 shows the median NPVs over various horizons for 1 
million simulations. With a 10-year horizon, there is an estimated 37.8% chance that the NPV 
will be negative (an IRR below 6%) and a 12.4% chance that the IRR will be negative. With an 
infinite horizon, there is an estimated 20.7% chance that the NPV will be negative and a 0.0% 
chance that the IRR will be negative.
Figure 6 shows the complete estimated probability distribution (labeled variable-rate 
mortgage). Table 12 and Figure 6 show that: (a) the probability distribution for a variable-rate 
mortgage is somewhat more dispersed than for a fixed-rate mortgage, because of the increased 
cash flow risk; and (b) the probability distribution for a 10-year horizon is more dispersed than 
for an infinite horizon, because of uncertainty regarding the sale price.
Predicting  Policy Effects
Our model can also be used to predict the effects of various policy actions on fundamental 
values. For example, if our general conclusion—that there may be some frothy local markets, but 
no national bubble in single-family home prices—is correct, then monetary policy is a blunt 
instrument for letting the air out of local bubblets. Should the Fed increase interest rates and 
lower fundamentals values in Atlanta, Dallas, and Indianapolis in order to deflate San Mateo? 
Table 11 shows the predicted effects on housing premium of changes in mortgage rates and 
required returns, due perhaps to inflation or monetary policies. Another way to look at these 
data are the predicted changes in fundamental values show in Table 13. A one-percentage-point 
change in mortgage rates clearly has substantial effects on fundamental values.
This past November, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) noted 
29that many countries, including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, do not allow a home 
mortgage interest deduction in the calculation of taxable income. In order to make their 
recommendation somewhat more politically palatable, they instead recommended replacing the 
deductibility of mortgage interest from federal income taxes with a tax credit equal to 15% of the 
mortgage interest paid that year, subject to some maximum limit.  Because the details of this 
proposal are unclear, we analyze the effects on fundamental values of two policies: (a) the 
complete elimination of the interest deduction; and (b) its replacement with a 15% tax credit 
without a cap.
Table 14 shows the implied median fundamental values by city for a 10-year horizon and an 
infinite horizon. Relative to the current deductibility of mortgage interest, the 15% credit would 
reduce our median estimates of fundamental value across cities by 11-17 percent for a 10-year 
horizon and by 4-6 percent for an infinite horizon, and the elimination of the tax benefit 
completely would reduce our median estimates of fundamental values by 20-30 percent for a 10-
year horizon and by 9-13 percent for an infinite horizon.
Looked at the other way around and using a 10-year horizon, the current deductibility of 
mortgage interest increases our median estimates of fundamental values across cities by 12-20% 
relative to a 15% tax credit and by 26-43 percent relative to no tax benefits.
So, Why Have Housing Prices Increased?
If our conclusion—that houses in these metropolitan areas are not wildly out of line with 
fundamentals—is correct, then how do we explain the recent run up in housing prices? There are 
two possible explanations: fundamentals have increased rapidly, or prices were substantially 
below fundamental values in the past and this discount has been shrinking as prices have been 
moving closer to fundamental values. We can’t say how much of the increase in housing prices is 
due to the first factor and how much to the second without expanding our present study to 
30include historical estimates of the valuation premium in each of these ten metropolitan areas.
That task is far beyond the scope of this paper. But our anecdotal evidence is that, at least in 
that part of Los Angeles County where we live, home prices three-to-five years ago were much 
farther below fundamental values than they are today. One of the authors of this paper is not 
only an economics professor, but is also a Certified Financial Planner (CFP) and has been 
advising prospective homebuyers for several years now. Up until very recently, it was very clear 
that it was more financially advantageous to buy a house than to rent one; the decision now is 
much less obvious than it was in the past.
For a modest test of this anecdotal evidence, we collected matched rental and sale data for Los 
Angeles County, where we live, for the years 2001 through 2004, to supplement our 2005 data. 
This is a particularly interesting time period since the OFHEO index of housing prices for the 
Los Angeles metropolitan area doubled during these five years.
We followed exactly the same procedure used for our 2005 study. We were able to obtain 
between 84 and 121 matched pairs for each year and, as before, adjusted all rents and sale prices 
to July 15 of each year. After determining historical values for the model’s parameters (mortgage 
rates, tax rates, homeowner’s insurance, and so on), we calculated the after-tax IRRs and 
valuation premiums for each matched pair.
The median values for each year are shown in Table 15. Consistent with our anecdotal 
evidence, home prices were substantially below fundamental values three-to-five years ago. After 
2003, the after-tax IRR dropped sharply and the discount of prices to fundamental values 
narrowed dramatically.
We do not have matched-pair data for earlier years, but perhaps we can assume that historical 
movements in matched-pair prices and rents are reasonably well approximated by the OFHEO 
house-price index and the BLS owner’s equivalent rent index. In our 2001 matched-pair data, the 
31average house price was $320,714 and the average value of the ratio of monthly rent to price was 
0.00598, implying a monthly rent of  0.00598($320,714) = $1,920. We used the Los Angeles 
OFHEO house-price index and BLS rent index to extrapolate the $320,714 house price and 
$1,920 forward to 2005 and backward to 1983 (the earliest year with both OFHEO and BLS 
data). This yielded an annual set of hypothetical matched rents and prices. For simplicity, we 
assumed a 3% anticipated growth in rents throughout this period—surely a conservative estimate 
in the early 1980s! Historical values for mortgage rates, tax rates, and the model’s other 
parameters were then used to estimate after-tax IRRs and valuation premiums for each year from 
1983 through 2005.
Figure 7 shows these price and value estimates for an infinite horizon. In 1983 and 1984, even 
with a 13% 30-year mortgage rate and assuming only a 3% increase in rents, prices were 14% 
below fundamental values. In 1984, the 30-year mortgage rate rose to 14.7% and fundamental 
values dipped, reducing the valuation discount from 14% to 4%. Then mortgage rates started 
falling and fundamental values temporarily raced ahead of market prices. Between 1985 and 1990, 
market prices nearly doubled and the discount disappeared. Mortgage rates kept falling—from 
10.0% in 1990 to 7.0% in 1998—but house prices declined, opening up a huge gap between 
fundamental values and market prices. After 1996, market prices began rising again but mortgage 
rates kept falling—from 8.2% in 2000 to 5.6% in 2003—and market prices were still well below 
fundamental values. For the 11-year period 1993-2003, our analysis would have clearly favored 
buying over renting for households with long horizons. Mortgage rates stabilized in 2004 and 
2005 and rapidly rising market prices reduced the discount to less than 10%.
Figure 8 shows the estimated valuation premiums: the percentage by which market price was 
above or below fundamental value. The similar movements of the premium estimates based on 
the matched-pair data and the extrapolated data during the years 2001-2005 are reassuring. It is 
32striking that the premium was negative (with price below fundamental value—often far below) 
for 21 of these 23 years. So, why did housing prices in LA County double between 2001 and 
2005? By our reckoning, fundamental values increased by about 40% during this period and the 
discount of prices from fundamental values, which had been nearly 40% in 2001, shrank to less 
than 10% in 2005.
These calculations reveal a fundamental problem with regression models of housing prices that 
assume that market prices have historically fluctuated around fundamental values, being above 
fundamental values about as often as below. Such models assume that because current LA market 
prices are well above the values predicted by these regression models, they must also be well 
above fundamental values. If, in fact, the historical market prices used to estimate these models 
have consistently been well below fundamental values, then current market prices need not be 
above fundamental values.
Figures 9 through 17 show similar backcast calculations for the nine other metropolitan areas. 
In each case, we use the OFHEO and BLS indexes and median matched-pair data for 2005 to 
estimate hypothetical matched prices and rents for each year back to 1983. As in the Los Angeles 
County case, historical parameter values were then used to estimate after-tax IRRs and 
fundamental values each year.
At any point in time, fundamental values differ across metropolitan areas primarily because of 
differences in rent levels and state tax laws; the zigs and zags in fundamental values over time are 
fairly similar because they are mostly caused by changes in interest rates, federal tax laws, and 
other macroeconomic events. However, the changes in market prices over time are quite different 
across metropolitan areas. San Mateo prices are quite volatile and were above fundamental value 
more often than below. San Bernardino and Orange County were much like neighboring Los 
Angeles County—prices generally below fundamental values with a runup close to fundamental 
33values in the late 1980s, then a falling off followed by an eventual closing of the gap by 2005. In 
Boston, Chicago, and Dallas, prices were close to fundamentals for much of the 1980s, but have 
lagged behind since then. In New Orleans, market prices were briefly close to fundamentals in 
1883 and 1984, but have since been below fundamentals. In Atlanta and Indianapolis, market 
prices have been well below fundamental values for 23 years.
If one were to use different macroeconomic assumptions—for example, a substantially higher 
or lower required return—the fundamental values in all ten areas would be adjusted in the same 
direction. Thus if the required return were increased sufficiently to get fundamental values aligned 
with market prices in Indianapolis and Atlanta, fundamental values would be far below market 
prices in many of the other cities. These data reinforce our earlier argument that market prices do 
not appear to fluctuate randomly about fundamental values.
Survey Data
We also conducted a small mail survey to gauge how home purchases might be influenced by 
financial considerations. Surveys were mailed to 1,000 randomly selected households (100 in each 
metropolitan area) who had purchased houses in July, 2005. The key question was:
If you hadn’t bought this house, but were renting it instead, how much would you be willing 
to pay for rent each month?
From our sale data, we already knew the sale price and the number of bedrooms, baths, and 
square footage of these houses. Our survey was intended to gauge preferences by putting a dollar 
figure on how much they value living on their house, what we will call “rental value.” Responses 
were received from 94 out of 1,000 households.
One potentially appealing feature of these data is that each response yields price and rent data 
for a single house. If the respondents’ rental estimates are reliable, then surveys might be a 
feasible way of gathering data for gauging the fundamental value of houses in different housing 
34markets. To assess the reliability of the survey responses, we compared the implied fundamental 
values to those derived from the perfect matches we observed.
Table 16 shows the average number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and square footage of the 
observed and surveyed houses. The samples seem generally comparable with respect to these 
three characteristics, the exceptions being the very small samples for Boston, Chicago, and New 
Orleans. Table 17 shows several financial characteristics (we should not take the results for 
Boston, Chicago, and New Orleans too seriously). It is particularly striking that the sale prices 
were usually higher for the survey houses than for the observed houses, yet the estimated rental 
values were lower. These low rental values imply low fundamental values for the houses they 
bought, in that the median premium was typically higher with the survey data than with the 
observed data. 
Indianapolis is a strong example of this in that the average sale price for the surveyed houses is 
nearly twice the average sale price for the observed houses, yet the average estimated rental value 
is 25% lower. Looking at the individual responses, it seems as if homebuyer rental values are 
quite different from rents. What are we to make of the household that purchased a 4 bedroom, 3-
bath, 2,430-square foot house in Indianapolis for $259,000 and estimated the rental value to be 
$650/month? For the Indianapolis houses in our sample with sale prices between $200,000 and 
$300,000, the average sale price was $236,000 and the average monthly rent was $1,740, with no 
house renting for less than $1,200 a month. Overall, 8 of the 9 survey responses are below a least 
squares line relating rent to price for our observed Indianapolis data.
We also asked those surveyed to estimate the “Predicted annual rate of increase of this house’s 
price over the next 10 years.” The median answer was 5%. For the 45 respondents in Boston and 
the four California areas, the median answer was 7%; for the 39 respondents in the other five 
markets, the median answer was 5% (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sided p = 0.003.) These 
35answers seem a bit optimistic, but certainly not delirious. (Case and Shiller (2003) asked a similar 
question in a survey of persons who bought homes between March and August 2002 and found 
the average answers to be 13.1% in Orange County, 15.7% in San Francisco, 14.6% in Boston, 
and 11.7% in Milwaukee; we do not know why our survey obtained much lower numbers.) It is 
also interesting that 10 of our 94 respondents did not answer this question, instead putting a 
question mark, writing “not sure,” or simply leaving it blank.
To be sure, there were some aggressive answers: 16 of 84 (19 percent) gave numbers larger 
than 10%, ranging all the way up to 50% for one cheerful or confused San Mateo household. (Did 
they mean 50% over 10 years, or 50% a year for 10 years?) On the other hand, 26 (31%) gave 
answers below 5%. In Boston and the four California areas, 8 gave numbers below 5% and 13 
gave numbers above 10%. Overall, these homebuyers do not seem as out of touch with reality as 
were the stock buyers surveyed during the dot-com bubble whose median expectation was 15% 
annual returns over the next 10 years.
Overall, the homebuyers who responded to our survey seem somewhat optimistic about 
future housing prices, but inclined to give rental values substantially below market rents. Perhaps 
this is why they bought instead of rented.
Conclusion
Measures of housing bubbles generally compare movements in home price indexes to the 
consumer price index, household income, rent indexes, or the values predicted by multiple 
regression models of housing prices. None of these measures can gauge whether housing prices 
are above or below fundamental values—the projected net rental savings, discounted by a 
required rate of return. Homebuyers do not seem to be a reliable source of information about 
rental savings; instead, it seems safer to gather such data from market rents and prices of matched 
pairs of houses.
36To gauge whether the projected cash flow from a house justifies the current price, with no 
assumptions about future prices, we look at an infinite horizon. In our data, the median after-tax 
IRRs with an infinite horizon ranged from 4.6% in San Mateo to 21.2% in Indianapolis. With a 
10-year horizon, and assuming that prices increase by 3% a year, the after-tax IRRs range from 
3.5% in San Mateo to 23.6% in Indianapolis. For a homebuyer with a 6% after-tax required 
return, our baseline assumptions imply that the median San Mateo house sold for 54% above 
fundamental value with an infinite horizon and 42% above fundamental value with a 10-year 
horizon and home prices rising by 3% a year. In contrast, the median Indianapolis house sold for 
65% below fundamental value with an infinite horizon and 68% below fundamental value with a 
10-year horizon.
Housing prices in all of these areas can be justified by plausible, if perhaps somewhat 
optimistic, assumptions about the future growth or rent and prices. Even in San Mateo, the 
bubbliest city, homebuyers with a 6% after-tax required return would be better off buying than 
renting if rents and prices increase by 4% a year for the next 10 years. In Atlanta, Dallas, New 
Orleans, and especially Indianapolis, houses were cheap in the summer of 2005. Even with 2% 
rent growth and no price growth for 10 years, the median Indianapolis homebuyer with a 6% 
after-tax required return bought a house for a price 37% below the house’s fundamental value. All 
of these calculations underestimate the fundamental value of houses to the extent that 
homebuyers value privacy and other nonfinancial factors that we did not consider in our 
calculations. In addition, homebuyers who only plan to live in a house for ten years can usually 
reduce their mortgage rate by taking out a 15-year mortgage, rather than a 30-year mortgage.
In a bubble, market prices are far above fundamental values calculated with reasonable 
assumptions about the future cash flow. By this definition, there is no bubble in the prices of 
single-family homes in 2005. On the other hand, it would take a very peculiar set of assumptions 
37to get fundamental values randomly fluctuating about market prices for 23 years in all 10 of the 
areas we examined. Thus, historical market prices are an unreliable gauge of whether current 
market prices are above or below fundamental values. The observation that real estate prices are 
higher than they used to be or higher than the values predicted by models using historical prices 
does not prove that current prices are above fundamental values. The only way to answer that 
question is to estimate fundamental values.
Housing prices have increased rapidly in many areas in recent years and some homebuyers 
have unrealistic expectations about future prices. The relevant question, however, is not how 
much prices have increased in the past or how fast people expect them to increase in the future, 
but whether, at current prices, a house is still a fundamentally sound investment. Our answer is 
generally yes, if the owner plans to stay in the area for many years to come.
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40Table 1  Percent Overpriced or Underpriced, Summer 2005
National City Corp Local Market Monitor
San Bernardino County 65 56
Los Angeles County 54 61
Orange County 44 61
San Mateo County 35 35
Boston 18 29
Chicago 21 9
New Orleans 12 -9
Atlanta 2 -4
Indianapolis -5 -19
Dallas -16 -14
sources:
National City Corporation: Richard DeKaser, House Prices in America, December 2005, Global 
Insight/National City Corporation
Local Market Monitor; Ingo Winzer, Home Value Ratings, Retrieved December 21, 2005, from 
http://www.localmarketmonitor.com/
41Table 2  Annual Increases in Population, Median Household Income, House Prices, and Rents, %
1985-2005 1995-2005
                                                                                                
population income Price Rent Price Rent
San Bernardino County 3.07 2.79 6.65 3.81 10.43 2.73
Los Angeles County 0.98 2.38 7.45 3.81 10.42 3.72
Orange County 1.61 2.56 7.53 3.81 11.04 3.58
San Mateo County 0.60 3.35 8.25 4.02 10.39 4.12
Boston 0.14 3.48 6.58 4.14 10.02 4.49
Chicago 0.10 2.62 6.11 3.97 6.11 3.26
New Orleans -0.53 2.76 3.47 NA 5.51 NA
Atlanta 1.76 2.84 4.21 2.44 5.34 2.31
Indianapolis 0.54 3.07 4.03 NA 3.60 NA
Dallas 1.36 2.59 1.88 2.48 4.20 2.92
source: U. S. Census Bureau, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight ( OFHEO ) house 
price indexes, and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) owner-equivalent rent indexes. The index 
values are for July of the respective years.
42Table 3  Mean Physical Characteristics of Sold and Rented Houses
Sold Houses Rented Houses
                                                                                                         
Bedrooms Baths Square Feet Bedrooms Baths Square Feet
San Mateo County 3.18 2.19 1,858 3.14 2.23 1,866
Orange County 3.56 2.48 2,006 3.53 2.51 1,994
Los Angeles County 3.46 2.12 1,754 3.45 2.08 1,753
Boston 3.34 1.99 1,803 3.18 1.87 1,801
Chicago 3.22 2.12 1,951 2.92 2.04 1,934
San Bernardino County 3.50 2.36 1,830 3.49 2.38 1,827
Dallas 2.83 1.68 1,484 2.87 1.72 1,470
New Orleans 3.02 1.88 1,681 3.01 1.86 1,683
Atlanta 3.42 2.32 NA 3.42 2.32 NA
Indianapolis 3.26 2.41 1,758 3.28 2.42 1,756
43Table 4  Mean Absolute Values of Differences in Physical Characteristics
of Sold and Rented Houses
Observations Bedrooms Baths Square Feet Distance
San Mateo County 90 0.21 0.17 42.0 0.40
Orange County 116 0.16 0.08 32.8 0.31
Los Angeles County 103 0.20 0.08 34.2 0.41
Boston 85 0.42 0.28 61.6 0.61
Chicago 85 0.49 0.50 64.6 0.75
San Bernardino County 133 0.12 0.07 12.7 0.33
Dallas 121 0.17 0.13 40.0 0.38
New Orleans 125 0.16 0.10 45.7 0.42
Atlanta 83 0.00 0.00 NA 0.04
Indianapolis 103 0.12 0.03 29.3 0.20
44Table 5  Mean Initial Financial Characteristics of Sold and Rented Houses, July 2005
Monthly Annual Monthly Cash Annual Cash
Sale Price ($) Rent ($) Rent/Price (%) Flow ($) Flow/Price(%)
San Mateo 1,200,020 2,987 3.05 -2,698 -2.64
Orange County 801,210 2,670 4.09 -1,266 -1.81
Los Angeles 572,408 2,128 4.55 -632 -1.24
Boston 570,342 2,216 4.89 -634 -1.13
Chicago 467,422 2,135 6.09 -248 -0.11
San Bernardino 463,795 1,899 5.01 -343 -0.79
Dallas 166,940 1,157 9.30 92 1.43
New Orleans 204,814 1,207 7.57 141 1.31
Atlanta 170,146 1,280 9.46 367 3.03
Indianapolis 145,924 1,172 10.39 347 3.32
note: The monthly rent and monthly cash flow are for the first year. Annual rent/Price is the first 
year’s rent as a percentage of the purchase price. Annual Cash Flow/Price is the first year’s net 
cash flow as a percentage of the purchase price.
45Table 6  Mean Sale Price P; Median NPV, IRR, and Premium
Infinite Horizon
P ($) NPV ($) IRR (%) Premium (%)
San Mateo 1,200,020 -328,298 4.61 54
Orange County 801,210 -14,787 5.90 2
Los Angeles 572,408 62,299 6.62 -11
Boston 570,342 62,269 6.66 -12
Chicago 467,422 86,498 7.18 -17
San Bernardino 463,795 106,323 7.33 -20
Dallas 166,940 127,660 13.04 -40
New Orleans 204,814 165,917 13.01 -46
Atlanta 170,146 215,929 18.42 -53
Indianapolis 145,924 223,216 21.21 -65
10-Year Horizon
P ($) NPV ($) IRR (%) Premium (%)
San Mateo 1,200,020 -65,915 3.51 42
Orange County 801,210 6,440 6.37 -4
Los Angeles 572,408 28,089 7.86 -17
Boston 570,342 25,617 7.66 -15
Chicago 467,422 30,907 8.76 -23
San Bernardino 463,795 35,632 9.10 -26
Dallas 166,940 35,516 16.23 -43
New Orleans 204,814 45,693 16.18 -49
Atlanta 170,146 61,441 21.46 -56
Indianapolis 145,924 56,400 23.56 -68
46Table 7  Percent Overpriced or Underpriced, Summer 2005
Smith & Smith
                             
National City Corp Local Market Monitor forever 10-year
San Mateo County 35 35 54 42
Orange County 44 61 2 -4
Los Angeles County 54 61 -11 -17
Boston 18 29 -12 -15
Chicago 21 9 -17 -23
San Bernardino County 65 56 -20 -26
Dallas -16 -14 -40 -43
New Orleans 12 -9 -46 -49
Atlanta 2 -4 -53 -56
Indianapolis -5 -19 -65 -68
47Table 8  Median Premium for different matching criteria
Forever
same house perfect match close match all matches
Obs. Premium Obs. Premium Obs. Premium Obs. Premium
San Mateo 4 40 7 38 27 54 90 54
Orange County 10 -3 16 -3 46 0 116 2
Los Angeles 10 -22 12 -21 37 -23 103 -11
Boston 3 -6 5 -28 9 -24 85 -12
Chicago 1 -58 1 -58 4 -59 85 -17
San Bernardino 27 -26 33 -21 67 -20 133 -20
Dallas 7 -53 7 -53 42 -41 121 -40
New Orleans 1 -19 2 -35 33 -47 125 -46
Atlanta 24 -53 57 -54 83 -53 83 -53
Indianapolis 15 -75 18 -73 62 -68 103 -65
10-Year Horizon
same house perfect match close match all matches
Obs. Premium Obs. Premium Obs. Premium Obs. Premium
San Mateo 4 30 7 28 27 43 90 42
Orange County 10 -8 16 -8 46 -5 116 -4
Los Angeles 10 -28 12 -27 37 -19 103 -17
Boston 3 -10 5 -31 9 -27 85 -15
Chicago 1 -61 1 -61 4 -62 85 -23
San Bernardino 27 -31 33 -26 67 -26 133 -26
Dallas 7 -55 7 -55 42 -44 121 -43
New Orleans 1 -23 2 -38 33 -50 125 -49
Atlanta 24 -57 57 -57 83 -56 83 -56
Indianapolis 15 -76 18 -75 62 -70 103 -68
same house: houses that were both rented and sold in the summer of 2005
perfect match: houses that have the same number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and square footage, 
and are less than 0.05 miles from each other.
close match: the same number of bedrooms, the same number of bathrooms, a square-footage 
difference less than 50, and are less than 0.50 miles from each other.
48Table 9  Median Premium for different growth rates of rents and prices
rent growth = 2% rent growth = 3% rent growth = 4%
                                                                                                                    
price growth 0% 3% 6% forever 0% 3% 6% forever 0% 3% 6% forever
                                                                                                                               
San Mateo 169 50 -62 142 152 42 -63 54 137 33 -65 -10
Orange County 74 1 -70 50 65 -4 -71 2 56 -9 -72 -37
Los Angeles 52 -13 -77 29 44 -17 -78 -11 36 -22 -79 -44
Boston 54 -11 -77 29 45 -15 -78 -12 38 -20 -79 -45
Chicago 36 -18 -78 19 29 -23 -79 -17 23 -27 -80 -48
San Bernardino 36 -22 -80 15 29 -26 -81 -20 23 -24 -81 -50
Dallas -13 -40 -76 -15 -17 -43 -77 -40 -21 -46 -78 -62
New Orleans -13 -46 -84 -25 -17 -49 -85 -46 -21 -51 -85 -65
Atlanta -29 -54 -84 -35 -32 -56 -85 -53 -35 -58 -85 -69
Indianapolis -37 -66 -93 -52 -41 -68 -93 -65 -44 -69 -94 -77
Note: Price growth rates of 0%, 3%, and 6% are over 10-year horizons; “forever” is an infinite 
horizon with no assumptions regarding future housing prices. The results for the baseline case of 
3% rent growth and 3% price growth are boldfaced.
49Table 10  Median IRR with 60-year Horizon and Moves that Incur
6% Transaction Costs Every 10 or 15 Years
rent growth = 2% rent growth = 3% rent growth = 4%
                                                                                                                    
house turnover 10 years 15 years 10 years 15 years 10 years 15 years
                                                                                                                               
San Mateo 2.58 2.87 3.56 3.85 4.79 6.03
Orange County 3.64 3.96 5.00 5.32 6.58 7.39
Los Angeles 4.25 4.61 5.75 6.10 7.43 8.10
Boston 4.33 4.67 5.84 6.18 7.54 8.18
Chicago 4.67 5.04 6.34 6.71 8.16 8.74
San Bernardino 4.81 5.19 6.46 6.84 8.26 8.84
Dallas 8.68 9.36 11.87 12.48 14.55 15.09
New Orleans 9.18 9.86 11.83 12.44 14.17 14.72
Atlanta 14.52 15.38 17.30 17.98 19.61 20.17
Indianapolis 17.76 18.50 20.28 20.88 22.46 22.96
50Table 11  Median Premium for Different Mortgage Rates RM and Required Returns R
RM = 4.7%, R = 5.3% RM = 5.7%, R = 6% RM = 6.7%, R = 6.7%
                                                                                                                    
horizon 10 years infinite 10 years infinite 10 years infinite
                                                                                                                                                        
San Mateo 4 22 42 54 70 86
Orange County -23 -18 -4 2 14 22
Los Angeles -35 -30 -17 -11 0 6
Boston -34 -31 -15 -12 3 6
Chicago -39 -33 -23 -17 -3 -1
San Bernardino -42 -37 -26 -20 -7 -4
Dallas -52 -49 -43 -40 -33 -32
New Orleans -60 -56 -49 -46 -37 -36
Atlanta -64 -60 -56 -53 -47 -45
Indianapolis -76 -73 -68 -65 -59 -58
note: Premium is the percentage by which the market price exceeds the reservation price. The 
infinite horizon makes no assumptions regarding price growth.
51Table 12 NPVs for Stochastic Simulations with Fixed and Variable Mortgage Rates
Fixed Rate Variable Rate
                                                                                                          
Horizon median P[NPV P[NPV median P[NPV P[NPV
(years) NPV ($) < -50,000] < -100,000] NPV ($) < -50,000] < -100,000]
1 -28,413 0.02 0.00 -28,420 0.02 0.00
2 -20,337 0.07 0.00 -20,544 0.08 0.00
3 -12,856 0.11 0.00 -13,116 0.12 0.00
4 -5,937 0.13 0.01 -6,055 0.15 0.01
5 467 0.15 0.01 633 0.17 0.02
10 25,693 0.16 0.04 27,640 0.18 0.06
15 41,903 0.15 0.04 45,061 0.17 0.06
20 51,631 0.13 0.03 54,084 0.15 0.05
25 53,346 0.11 0.02 55,886 0.13 0.04
30 50,176 0.10 0.01 54,070 0.12 0.04
forever 58,290 0.03 0.00 61,190 0.07 0.01
52Table 13  Median Fundamental Values for Different Mortgage Rates RM and Required Returns R
RM = 4.7%, R = 5.3% RM = 5.7%, R = 6% RM = 6.7%, R = 6.7%
                                                                                                                    
horizon 10 years infinite 10 years infinite 10 years infinite
                                                                                                                                                        
San Mateo 926,311 831,616 715,600 661,475 578,677 549,115
Orange County 968,541 888,224 755,551 711,891 621,740 595,126
Los Angeles 876,989 790,470 675,709 630,800 549,236 523,939
Boston 776,790 712,529 591,930 565,315 478,040 467,820
Chicago 655,848 580,994 505,874 470,725 411,380 394,627
San Bernardino 812,875 729,944 627,472 582,309 510,593 484,191
Dallas 312,339 289,430 260,088 248,019 222,994 216,607
New Orleans 452,159 408,740 353,051 333,353 289,326 280,956
Atlanta 433,065 387,807 349,732 325,730 293,305 280,191
Indianapolis 538,412 470,175 402,541 372,609 314,061 305,924
53Table 14  Median Fundamental Values for Different Tax Treatment of Home Mortgage Interest
Current Deductibility 15% Credit No Tax Benefit
                                                                                                                    
horizon 10 years forever 10 years forever 10 years forever
                                                                                                                                                        
San Mateo 715,600 661,475 606,172 620,813 515,864 579,376
Orange County 755,551 711,891 650,016 670,071 558,648 627,988
Los Angeles 675,709 630,800 575,050 591,519 490,436 552,90
Boston 591,930 565,315 506,110 530,983 434,074 496,402
Chicago 505,874 470,725 434,816 443,831 374,413 416,423
San Bernardino 627,472 582,309 534,138 546,831 456,263 510,503
Dallas 260,088 248,019 232,696 237,355 207,017 225,944
New Orleans 353,051 333,353 311,246 317,326 274,087 300,421
Atlanta 349,732 325,730 307,673 309,731 269,918 293,245
Indianapolis 402,541 372,609 336,039 349,052 280,465 325,223
54Table 15  Median IRR and Premium for Matches in Los Angeles County
After-Tax IRR (%) Premium (%)
                                                                                           
Obs. 10-year horizon forever 10-year horizon forever
                                                                                                                                                        
2001 84 15.06 12.28 -40 -36
2002 97 14.18 11.29 -42 -37
2003 121 12.29 9.49 -42 -37
2004 89 8.59 7.17 -19 -14
2005 103 7.86 6.62 -17 -11
note: Premium is the percentage by which the market price exceeds the reservation price. Forever 
is for an infinite horizon with no assumptions regarding price growth.
55Table 16  Mean Physical Characteristics of Observed and Surveyed Houses
Observed Houses Survey Houses
                                                                                                         
Obs. Bedrooms Baths Square Feet Obs. Bedrooms Baths Square Feet
San Mateo 4 3.00 2.00 1,775 12 3.33 2.12 1,802
Orange County 10 3.90 2.60 2,166 11 3.55 2.57 2,034
Los Angeles 10 3.50 2.17 1,790 7 3.71 2.25 1,858
Boston 3 3.33 2.67 2,352 8 3.25 1.94 1,756
Chicago 1 3.00 4.00 4,934 5 3.60 1.66 2,021
San Bernardino 27 3.59 2.37 1,824 10 3.70 2.45 1,934
Dallas 7 3.00 1.79 1,447 15 2.80 1.89 1,655
New Orleans 1 4.00 3.00 2,900 8 3.00 2.00 1,892
Atlanta 24 3.71 2.58 NA 9 3.22 2.06 NA
Indianapolis 15 3.07 2.13 1,659 9 3.33 2.33 1,924
56Table 17  Financial Characteristics of Observed Perfect Matches and Surveyed Houses
Observed Perfect Matches Survey Houses
                                                                                                                   
Mean Mean Median Mean Mean Median
Obs. Sale Price Rent Premium Obs. Sale Price Rent Premium
San Mateo 4 1,050,993 2,858 40 12 1,109,883 2,690 41
Orange County 10 806,584 2,845 -3 11 785,557 2,211 40
Los Angeles 10 544,225 2,194 -22 7 627,526 1,985 34
Boston 3 992,587 2,833 -6 8 514,881 1,838 -20
Chicago 1 525,861 3,892 -58 5 461,202 1,660 -1
San Bernardino 27 459,227 1,971 -26 10 473,783 1,746 2
Dallas 7 141,204 1,241 -53 15 246,970 1,020 -2
New Orleans 1 443,693 1,961 -19 8 221,686 1,119 -30
Atlanta 24 204,884 1,508 -53 9 291,081 1,333 -10
Indianapolis 15 97,744 1,034 -75 9 187,114 767 -37
note: Premium is the percentage by which the market price exceeds the reservation price for an 
infinite horizon with no assumptions regarding price growth.
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Figure 2 Variation in Premiums for Full Sample by Metropolitan Area, infinite horizon
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Figure 6 Estimated Probability Distribution of Net Present Value
with Fixed-Rate or Variable-Rate Mortgage
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Figure 7 Los Angeles  County Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
note: The annual prices were estimated by using the OFHEO house-price index to extrapolate the 
$320,714 average LA County house price in our 2001 matched-pair data. The annual fundamental 
values (or reservation prices) were estimated by using the OFHEO house-price index and the 
BLS owner’s equivalent rent index to extrapolate the 2001 matched-pair price and rent data.
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Figure 8 Los Angeles  County Annual Premium, infinite horizon
note:  The premium is the percentage by which the market price exceeds the reservation price. 
The annual premiums shown by the dark line for 2001-2005 were estimated from matched-pair 
data. The annual premiums shown by the lighter line for 1983-2005 were estimated by using the 
OFHEO house-price index and the BLS owner’s equivalent rent index to extrapolate the 2001 
matched-pair price and rent data.
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Figure 9 San Mateo Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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Figure 10 Orange County Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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Figure 11 Boston Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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Figure 12 Chicago Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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Figure 13 San Bernardino Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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Figure 14 Dallas Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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Figure 15 New Orleans Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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Figure 16 Atlanta Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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Figure 17 Indianapolis Annual Housing Price P and Fundamental Value V, infinite horizon
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